The institutionalist branch of “Law and Courts” studies how judges incorporate institutional constraints into their decisionmaking processes. Congressional constraints on judicial review, as the literature currently stands, fall into one of two general classes: overrides and Court-curbing measures. This taxonomy, however, is incomplete. Neither overrides nor curbing measures are needed to explain the not uncommon situation where a policy-oriented Justice deviates from a preferred vote based on t

The prevailing approach to First Amendment equal-access litigation, turning on the "general inclusivity" of government access, is deeply flawed. The standard has proved to be, in the end, exceedingly permissive, hopelessly vague, and, perhaps most importantly, theoretically incompatible with the Supreme Court's emerging view that access is a form of government subsidy. This essay calls on the courts to abandon their reliance on inclusiveness, and, in its place, tailor the definition of "access

The institutionalist branch of “Law and Courts” studies how judges incorporate institutional constraints into their decisionmaking processes. Congressional constraints on judicial review, as the literature currently stands, fall into one of two general classes: overrides and Court-curbing measures. This taxonomy, however, is incomplete. Neither overrides nor curbing measures can explain the not uncommon situation where a policy-oriented Justice deviates from a preferred vote based on the belief

The prevailing approach to First Amendment equal-access litigation, turning on the "general inclusivity" of government access, is deeply flawed. The standard has proved to be, in the end, unduly formalistic, hopelessly vague, and, perhaps most importantly, theoretically incompatible with the Supreme Court's emerging view that access is a form of government subsidy. This paper calls on the courts to abandon their reliance on inclusiveness, and, in its place, tailor the definition of "access"

The prevailing approach to First Amendment equal-access litigation, turning on the "general inclusivity" of government access, is deeply flawed. The standard has proved to be, in the end, exceedingly permissive, hopelessly vague, and, perhaps most importantly, theoretically incompatible with the Supreme Court's emerging view that access is a form of government subsidy. This essay calls on the courts to abandon their reliance on inclusiveness, and, in its place, tailor the definition of "access

The prevailing approach to First Amendment equal-access litigation, turning on the "general inclusivity" of government access, is deeply flawed. The standard has proved to be, in the end, exceedingly permissive, hopelessly vague, and, perhaps most importantly, theoretically incompatible with the Supreme Court's emerging view that access is a form of government subsidy. This essay calls on the courts to abandon their reliance on inclusiveness, and, in its place, tailor the definition of "access

The prevailing approach to First Amendment equal-access litigation, turning on the "general inclusivity" of government access, is deeply flawed. The standard has proved to be, in the end, exceedingly permissive, hopelessly vague, and, perhaps most importantly, theoretically incompatible with the Supreme Court's emerging view that access is a form of government subsidy. This essay calls on the courts to abandon their reliance on inclusiveness, and, in its place, tailor the definition of "access" to include only those government acts conducted "pursuant to official duties." The resulting doctrine would be one worthy of the federal courts -- durable, coherent, and duly respectful of the traditional relations between public officials and the press.

The presidencies of William J. Clinton and George W. Bush are in many ways kindred. It seems certain that both will be noted by historians for their determined and mechanistic evasions of public scrutiny. The misleading insinuations, failed memories, perjuries, obstructions of justice, and novel assertions of executive privilege have been exposed sharply and criticized roundly by Congress, academics, and the press. Still, there is a particular tactic of presidential evasion, utilized by C

The prevailing approach to First Amendment equal-access litigation, turning on the "general inclusivity" of government access, is deeply flawed. The standard has proved to be, in the end, unduly formalistic, hopelessly vague, and, perhaps most importantly, theoretically incompatible with the Supreme Court's emerging view that access is a form of government subsidy. This paper calls on the courts to abandon their reliance on inclusiveness, and, in its place, tailor the definition of "access" to include only those government acts conducted "pursuant to official duties." The resulting doctrine would be one worthy of the federal courts - durable, coherent, and duly respectful of the traditional relations between public officials and the press.

This article evaluates American fetal homicide laws in the light of John Rawls's political philosophy. In particular, it seeks to discern whether fetal homicide indicates a societal recognition of fetal personhood, and, if so, whether such recognition renders the right to abortion inconsistent with our principles of justice. The article proceeds in three parts. The first part outlines the contours of the bifurcated fetal-rights scheme and demonstrates that it is an established societal judgment with robust institutional support. The middle part introduces Rawls's philosophy, and explains how it can, under certain circumstances, provide us with insight into the stability of public policies. The final part, which constitutes the core of the article, uses Rawls's philosophical model to gauge the stability of the bifurcated fetal-rights scheme. Specifically, it demonstrates that, in a Rawlsian society, the emergence of fetal-homicide laws necessarily reflects a public ...